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Abstract
The recent split share structure reform in China involves the nontradable shareholders
proposing a compensation package to the tradable shareholders in exchange for the listing
rights of their shares. We find that state ownership (the major owners of nontradable shares)
has a positive effect on the final compensation ratio. In contrast, mutual fund ownership
(the major institutional owner of tradable shares) has a negative effect on the compensation
ratio and especially in state-owned firms. The evidence is consistent with our predictions
that state shareholders have incentives to complete the reform quickly and exert political
pressure on mutual funds to accept the terms without a fight.
I. Introduction
In this study, we examine the role played by government shareholders and
mutual funds in the recent reform of the split share structure in China. In so doing
we appeal to two recent strands of research: corporate privatization and restruc-
turing in transitional economies and the incentives and conflicts of interests in
financial intermediaries.1 Historically, the Chinese domestic A-shares are divided
into tradable and nontradable shares, although both types of shares have the same
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1Wahal (1996), Hartzell and Starks (2003), Parrino, Sias, and Starks (2003), and Gaspar, Massa,
and Matos (2005) represent some recent U.S. studies on the role of institutional investors in monitoring
the agency incentives of managers. Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Mahoney (2004), Davis and Kim
(2007), and Mehran and Stulz (2007) discuss conflicts of interest in the U.S. setting. Examples of
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(2005).
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cash flow and voting rights. This unique split share structure can lead to divergent
interests and incentive conflicts between tradable and nontradable shareholders
and has long been recognized as the source of many corporate governance prob-
lems in China (see Chen, Firth, Gao, and Rui (2006), Chen, Firth, Xin, and Xu
(2008), and Feinerman (2007)). To help solve the fundamental governance prob-
lems, the Chinese government initiated a split share structure reform program in
April 2005. The aim of the reform is to convert nontradable shares into tradable
shares.
The nontradable shareholders gain from the reform as their shares become
tradable (this increases liquidity and enables controlling shareholders to sell at
market prices2). In contrast, tradable shareholders may suffer in the short term
because there is an extra supply of tradable shares in the market and this could
lead to a steep decline in stock prices.3 To implement the reform, the nontrad-
able shareholders have to negotiate with the tradable shareholders on a suitable
compensation plan for converting nontradable shares to tradable shares; the gov-
ernment does not set the compensation terms. The plan needs approval by at least
two-thirds of the voting tradable shares. In most cases, the compensation involves
the nontradable shareholders giving shares to the tradable shareholders.
The roles of the state shareholders and mutual funds in this reform are partic-
ularly interesting. The state is the largest nontradable shareholder, while mutual
funds are the largest type of institutional investor in tradable shares in China’s
stock market. The nontradable shareholders need to offer compensation to trad-
able shareholders (including mutual funds) in order for the latter to agree to the
reform. In theory, the interests of mutual funds should align with the interests
of the individual investors in tradable shares. Individual investors can therefore
free ride on the efforts of mutual funds in the belief that the funds will look after
their interests (Davis and Kim (2007)).4 However, as recent research (Mehran
and Stulz (2007)) attests, the incentives facing financial institutions are com-
plex, and conflicts of interest and political pressures often arise. We will show
how political pressure, in particular, extends to the very specific case of mutual
fund voting on the share structure reform proposals of listed firms in China. The
share structure reform program provides a natural experimental setting within
which to examine the role of mutual funds in corporate governance and investor
protection.
We find that there is a positive and statistically significant relation between
state ownership and the final compensation ratio. In addition, there is strong
evidence that the positive effect of state ownership on compensation decreases
with the level of mutual fund ownership. This represents prima facie evidence
that mutual funds do not always act in the best interests of their unit holders.
The results are consistent with our argument that the government has strong
2A significant price discount usually exists for illiquid securities such as nontradable shares (see
Kahl, Liu, and Longstaff (2003), Longstaff (1995), (2001)).
3However, this loss is reduced if the reform process leads to an overall improvement in the firm’s
performance due to improved governance and management incentives.
4Furthermore, there is evidence from China that mutual fund ownership helps boost a firm’s per-
formance (Yuan, Xiao, and Zou (2008)) and that this benefits all shareholders.
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incentives to complete the reform smoothly and quickly through two mechanisms.
First, the state-controlled entities offer a relatively high compensation ratio (vis-
a`-vis private-controlled listed firms) to tradable shareholders so that agreement
is reached quickly. Second, the state exerts political pressure on the mutual fund
management company to refrain from bargaining for better terms so the negoti-
ations go smoothly and speedily. The negative impact of the interaction between
mutual fund ownership and state ownership on the compensation ratio supports
the view that mutual funds bow to political pressure to help state-owned firms get
the reform done quickly and at a relatively lower cost. We also conduct an event
study that examines the market reaction to the announcement of the final com-
pensation ratio and find that the presence of mutual funds weakens the positive
link between the announced compensation ratio and abnormal returns. Therefore,
the abnormal stock returns for state-owned firms with mutual fund ownership is
significantly lower than for firms without mutual fund ownership after control-
ling for the effect of the compensation ratio. This implies that individual investors
are disappointed at the role of mutual funds in the reform bargaining process in
state-owned firms. Overall, these findings lend support to our argument that po-
litical pressure compromises the role of mutual funds in maximizing the returns
to their unit holders. Our results illustrate how the government steered the share
structure reform by influencing both parties to the negotiation (the nontradable
shareholders and the tradable shareholders). The results imply that individual in-
vestors cannot rely on mutual funds to take actions that are always in the best
interests of all the tradable shareholders.
We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. In Section II we briefly
introduce the reform of the split share structure in China. We discuss the link
between state and mutual fund ownership and the compensation ratio offered by
nontradable shareholders in Section III. In so doing we provide an in-depth anal-
ysis of the incentives of the government and mutual fund companies. Section IV
describes the sample and variables, and Section V reports and discusses the em-
pirical results. Section VI concludes.
II. The Split Share Structure Reform
A. Split Share Structure and Firm Ownership
China established the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the early
1990s in order to help revitalize and refinance its ailing state-owned enterprises
(SOEs) and to help instill some elements of market discipline on top management.
At the same time, however, the government wanted to maintain its control or
influence over the SOEs and so it retained substantial ownership in many listed
firms (Chen et al. (2008)). The controlling shareholder (whether state or private5)
owns what are called state or legal person shares, and these are not publicly traded.
5Initially, listed firms had a state entity (central or local government or state ministry) as
the major or controlling shareholder. Over time, however, private entities or individuals have be-
come the controlling shareholder in many listed firms through mergers and acquisitions (Chow
(2007)).
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In practical terms, government bureaucrats administer the state’s shareholding.
Shares issued to the public, on the other hand, are tradable and are divided into
tradable A-shares (primarily for domestic investors) and foreign shares (B- and
H-shares).
Company ownership structure in China is highly concentrated by interna-
tional standards, and the largest shareholder usually has effective control over the
firm (Chen et al. (2008)). In contrast, each of the over 100 million individual in-
vestors in tradable shares typically owns a very small proportion of a company’s
total shares in issue. Not surprisingly, most individual investors in tradable shares
tend to be free riders and short-term speculators who have few incentives to attend
shareholders’ meetings and exercise their shareholder rights (Tenev, Zhang, and
Brefort (2002)).
B. The Reform of the Split Share Structure
Fully realizing the problems with the split share structure, the Chinese gov-
ernment began to reduce the proportion of state ownership by selling (nontrad-
able) state-owned shares into the market in June 2001. However, the measure
caused share prices to plummet by more than 30%, as investors feared the in-
creased supply of shares would flood the market (Kim, Ho, and St. Giles (2003)).
In light of the strong adverse reaction from tradable A-shareholders, the govern-
ment withdrew the plan in October 2002, and this marked the initial, albeit un-
successful, attempt at share ownership reform. The chronic governance problems
persisted, investors lost more confidence in the listed companies, and the stock
market crashed.6
With the avowed intent to improve corporate governance, the government re-
newed its effort to reform the split share structure in 2005. This time, to make the
reform palatable to the tradable shareholders, the government stated that the trad-
able shareholders have to be compensated and the compensation should be the
result of mutual agreement between the two types of shareholders (tradable and
nontradable). The reform involves the nontradable shareholders proposing a com-
pensation package to the tradable shareholders. Negotiations then ensue between
the major nontradable and tradable shareholders, and the initial proposal is re-
vised into a formal plan that is voted upon by the respective shareholders. The
plan needs approval from at least two-thirds of the total voting shares and two-
thirds of the voting tradable shares represented by investors who attend the share-
holders’ meeting, participate in the proxy voting, or cast their votes via the online
voting system.7 If the proposal is not accepted then the nontradable shareholders
have to come up with another proposal and negotiations begin afresh. The reg-
ulations state that there must be a gap of at least 3 months between proposals.
Thus, the voting down of a proposal severely delays the reform and, in the case of
6During this period, the Shanghai Composite Index plunged from its peak of about 2,245
points to around 998 points at the end of May 2005, with market fundraising activities shrinking
significantly.
7According to the regulations of the CSRC, B- and H-shareholders are not included in the reform,
but their proportional stake in a company will stay the same after the reform.
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state-controlled firms, is seen as a black mark against the government bureaucrats
who developed the proposal.8
In showing its determination to push forward the change, the China Secu-
rities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) set the end of 2006 as the target deadline
for listed companies to complete the reform. The CSRC selected two batches of
firms for a trial reform in May and June 2005. The trial was deemed a success, and
the full-scale reform then started. Two official documents govern the operational
procedures of the split share structure reform: Guidance Notes on the Split Share
Structure Reform of Listed Companies (“Guidance Notes”), issued on August 23,
2005, and Administrative Measures on the Split Share Structure Reform of Listed
Companies (the “CSRC Measures”), issued on September 4, 2005.
III. The Roles of the State and Mutual Funds in the Share
Structure Reform
A. The Role of State Ownership in the Share Structure Reform
We hypothesize that other things being equal, the level of state ownership is
likely to be positively related to the compensation ratio offered to tradable share-
holders for the following three reasons: First, the government is eager to complete
the reforms as early as possible, and it set the end of 2006 as the target date for
finalizing agreements with the tradable shareholders. To set an example to other
firms, the government wanted the state-controlled listed companies to complete
the reforms quickly with a minimum of fuss and dissent from the tradable share-
holders. To accomplish this, the bureaucrats who administer the state’s sharehold-
ings set more generous compensation terms than private-controlled firms. Given
the debacle surrounding the earlier attempt to reform the share ownership struc-
ture, the government wanted to ensure success the second time around.
Second, the state wishes to list more wholly owned state enterprises,9 and
the favorable investment sentiment that flows from a successful completion of
the reform will help achieve this goal. By paying relatively high compensation
in the share structure reform program, and thereby avoiding stockholder conflict,
the state believes the reform is more likely to succeed and future listings of state
enterprises will be easier.
Third, state-controlled firms are well-known for their acute owner-manager
agency problems because of the vaguely defined state ownership rights and the
delegation of management and monitoring functions to bureaucrats whose inter-
ests are not well aligned with those of the shareholders. The bureaucrats who
administer the state’s shareholdings are more interested in getting the reform com-
pleted quickly and efficiently, to gain political credit and maximize their move-
ment up the political hierarchy. As such, the bureaucrats are less concerned about
8An illustration of the reform process is found in an earlier version of this paper (Firth, Lin, and
Zou (2008)).
9For example, the Shanghai government recently unveiled a plan to have an additional 70 billion
yuan of state-owned assets listed by the end of 2010 (see Chen (April 24, 2008)).
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the level of compensation ratio offered and the dilution of control associated with
a higher compensation ratio, as it is not their personal investment. Moreover,
the top managers in state-controlled listed firms also favor higher compensation
(vis-a`-vis the private-controlled firms) for exactly the same reasons as the state
bureaucrats, to speed up the process and earn political kudos.10 In contrast, the
private investors who own nontradable shares care more about the financial costs
(that relate to the compensation ratio) instead of the political costs (that are asso-
ciated with a prolonged reform period). As a result, private-controlled firms are
likely to bargain very hard in order to minimize the dilution of their control and
cash flow rights and so reduce the cost of the reform borne by them. Therefore,
our first hypothesis is
H1. Other things being equal, the level of state ownership is positively related to
the compensation ratio offered to the tradable shareholders.
B. Mutual Funds in China and Their Role in the Share Structure Reform
In order to help stabilize the stock markets and strengthen corporate gover-
nance, the government made a strategic decision in year 2000 to develop securities
mutual funds as institutional investors in tradable shares (CSRC (2000)). Since
then, the growth of the mutual fund industry has been phenomenal. The number
of fund management companies increased from 6 in 1998 to 57 in 2006, while the
number of mutual funds increased from 5 in 1998 to 323 in 2006. The net asset
value of the mutual fund industry has increased from 10.74 billion yuan in 1998
to 818.48 billion yuan in 2006. The mutual fund industry is dominated by several
big players (e.g., Huaxia and Bosera), as evidenced by the market share of the top
5 and 10 fund management companies (41% and 60% at the end of 2006, respec-
tively). The implication of this feature for the voting behavior of mutual funds
is discussed later.11 Table 1 gives details of the rapid growth in mutual funds in
China. The mean mutual funds’ ownership in our sample firms represents about
14% of the total number of tradable A-shares in issue.
The voting rule set out by the CSRC Measures makes mutual funds a pow-
erful and influential party in the reform bargaining process because mutual funds
frequently appear among the top 10 shareholders of many listed companies. As an
illustration, assume 30% of a firm’s shares are tradable. According to the statistics
of the Wind Financial Information System, the average voting rate12 of tradable
A-shares in the reform vote is about 35%. The proposal is rejected if just more
than one-third of the votes are against it. In other words, the owners of 3.5%
(30% × 35% × 1/3) of the total number of shares in issue can effectively veto
10When the managers of state-controlled firms own shares in their company, they are trad-
able shares. This will motivate the managers to urge the nontradable shareholders to pay higher
compensation.
11We thank Stephen Brown (the editor) for raising this issue.
12The voting rate is the proportion of shares that vote in the shareholders’ meeting through proxy
collection or via online ballot. Many individual investors do not bother to vote, particularly when
mutual fund shareholders are present (we discuss this in Section V.C).
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TABLE 1
Mutual Fund Industry in China
Table 1 reports statistics on the mutual fund industry in China. Source: http://news1.jrj.com.cn/news/2007-01-
05/000001897594.html (Web page of “China Financial Industry”). Market share information is compiled from the Wind
Financial Information System.
Evolution of China’s Mutual Fund Industry
Mutual Fund Characteristic 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Number of fund management companies
New 6 4 0 5 6 12 12 8 4
Cumulative total 6 10 10 15 21 33 45 53 57
Number of funds
Open-end funds 0 0 0 3 18 60 112 177 269
Closed-end funds 5 23 34 48 54 54 54 54 54
Total 5 23 34 51 72 114 166 231 323
Net asset value (in billion yuan)
Open-end funds 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.80 52.69 90.04 246.32 428.18 657.81
Closed-end funds 10.74 51.42 84.56 70.00 71.71 86.20 80.96 82.21 160.67
Total 10.74 51.42 84.56 81.80 124.40 176.24 327.28 510.39 818.48
Assets under the management
of the top 5 fund houses
(in billion yuan) 10.74 51.42 84.56 42.38 54.09 67.42 131.06 212.20 332.92
Assets under the management
of the top 10 fund houses
(in billion yuan) 10.74 51.42 84.56 69.49 91.69 109.71 196.00 298.15 490.31
% of assets under the management
of the top 5 fund houses 100.00 100.00 100.00 51.80 43.48 38.25 40.04 41.58 40.68
% of assets under the management
of the top 10 fund houses 100.00 100.00 100.00 84.95 73.71 62.25 59.89 58.42 59.90
any reform plan should it prove to be unsatisfactory to these investors. The atti-
tudes of the mutual fund shareholders are therefore crucial to the passage of the
proposed reform plan. As such, it is interesting to examine the impact of mu-
tual fund shareholders on the final compensation ratio to assess whether mutual
funds have fought for better terms for the tradable shareholders. To gain a better
understanding of the way mutual funds will vote on the share restructure propos-
als, we need to examine the way mutual funds are organized and governed, and
the incentives and pressures they face.
In China, all mutual funds are contractual-form funds whereby investors
enter into a contract with a fund management firm (the sponsor and trustee)
and unit holders are the beneficial owners of the fund (Lu (Feb. 18, 2006)).
In contrast to the situation in the U.S.,13 a mutual fund in China does not have
a board of directors to act as a fund governance body and a buffer between
the unit holders and the fund management firm. One result of this is that it is
difficult to remove the fund management firm’s mandate to manage the mutual
fund. Additionally, compared with the corporate-form mutual funds that prevail
in the U.S., contractual-form mutual funds provide fewer voting rights for fund
investors (i.e., unit holders) and are therefore more prone to agency problems.
13Under the Investment Company Act of 1940 in the U.S., each open-end mutual fund is a company
owned by mutual fund investors with a board of directors elected by the shareholders’ meeting and
comprising at least 40% of independent directors (Mahoney (2004)). In a review of the literature,
Mehran and Stulz (2007) conclude that independent boards for mutual funds have value. Ferris and
Yan (2007) and Khorana, Tufano, and Wedge (2007) provide further evidence on the advantages of
having independent boards for mutual funds.
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These problems are particularly acute in China because of the weak and capri-
cious legal system and high information asymmetry.14 China’s Securities Invest-
ment Fund Law 2003 states that the fund unit holders enjoy voting rights on
some important matters (e.g., on changing the fund manager), but in practice
these rights are difficult to exercise because of stringent conditions that have
to be met.15 Therefore, the governance of mutual funds in China effectively re-
sides in the fund management firms whose interests may not perfectly align with
those of the unit holders and in specific cases may significantly diverge (Huang
(2006), Lu (Feb. 18, 2006)). Article 18 of the 2003 fund law prescribes that
the fund management firm should represent the unit holders in exercising liti-
gation rights and carrying out other legal actions for the interests of unit holders.
However, in practice, fund management firms and fund managers never sought
the opinion of the unit holders before they voted in the share structure reform
(Huang (2006)).
Mutual funds reward the fund house and fund managers primarily based on
the size of the fund they manage. If mutual fund shareholders fight hard for a bet-
ter compensation ratio in the reform, fund performance will improve and the fund
house will benefit via an increase in management fees resulting from the increased
fund size. The increase in fund size comes from a better compensation ratio and
from new unit sales that arise from an improved reputation for investment per-
formance. This reward structure implies that managers may fight hard for higher
compensation ratios if they have the voting rights. However, the CSRC took away
the voting rights of the individual fund managers for the share structure reform
decision and passed them to the investment decision committee of the fund man-
agement company. There are some not-so-subtle distinctions in the motivations of
the individual fund managers and the investment decision committee of the fund
management firm, which we discuss later in this section.
As discussed earlier, the CSRC is under pressure to ensure that the reform
is completed in a timely manner. The longer the reform drags on, the higher the
time-related costs (which include inhibiting the development of the stock market
and the damage to the government’s reputation and credibility). To speed up the
process, the CSRC put direct pressure on mutual funds to vote in the interest
of expediting the reform (Firth et al. (2008)). The CSRC holds regular meetings
with all fund management firms and uses these occasions to stress the need for
reaching a speedy and noncontentious conclusion to the share structure reform
proposals.
The CSRC is able to wield considerable influence on the mutual fund in-
dustry for three main reasons. First, the CSRC is the regulatory body that over-
sees mutual funds, and their powers (vested by the Securities Investment Fund
Law of 2003) are much greater than its U.S. counterpart (the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC)) in matters such as authorizing the setting up of fund
14Unlike their counterparts in the U.S., Chinese mutual funds are not required to disclose the way
they vote on company and shareholder resolutions. Thus, unit holders typically do not know whether
the mutual funds vote for proposals that favor the tradable shareholders.
15For example, a unit holders’ meeting can only be held if the owners of more than 50% of the
outstanding units attend in person or via correspondence participation.
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management firms (Articles 13 and 14) and the launching of new funds
(Article 40), approving the appointment and the change of senior management of
fund management firms (Article 17), and revoking the license of a fund manage-
ment firm when it deems that necessary (Article 21). Second, the government di-
rectly or indirectly owns almost all mutual fund management firms (they are often
sponsored by state-controlled entities such as securities companies, banks, large
listed companies, and more recently by insurance companies) (Hong Kong Stock
Exchange (2004), Kim et al. (2003)). Third, the CSRC requires that the voting
rights for the share structure reform proposals should rest with the investment
decision committee of the fund management firm instead of individual fund man-
agers. The investment decision committee consists of senior management of the
fund management firm whose appointment or removal, according to the Securi-
ties Investment Fund Law of 2003, needs approval from the CSRC. The members
of the committee are often former government bureaucrats and current members
of the Communist Party. While the CSRC has a lot of influence on the invest-
ment decision committee, it has less leverage on the actions of the individual fund
managers, and hence the CSRC decided to move the voting power to the invest-
ment committee. The individual fund managers are young investment profession-
als without any ideological ties, or strong career and monetary obligations, to the
government.
Given that the voting decision is centralized at the fund house level, se-
nior executives of fund houses need to weigh the costs and benefits of fighting
hard for better compensation terms in the reform. The major benefit, as men-
tioned earlier, is the potential increase in the management fee that is a percent-
age of any increase in the size of the fund. The cost will be the loss of valuable
opportunities (e.g., in terms of launching new funds, issuing new fund units) and
the adverse effects on the career prospects of senior executives in the fund indus-
try if their hard-line voting affects the fund management company’s relations with
the CSRC and the government. The perceived costs of upsetting the state and the
CSRC may be too high for the investment decision committees and so they vote in
favor of the reform proposal without bargaining for improved terms (particularly
in state-owned firms, see the discussion below). Finally, the highly concentrated
nature of the mutual fund industry also makes it easier for the CSRC to wield its
influence on the voting of mutual fund shareholders.16 Given the above reasoning,
we hypothesize:
H2. Other things being equal, the level of mutual fund ownership is nonpositively
related to the compensation ratio offered to the tradable shareholders.
Although this political pressure on mutual funds is applied to all share struc-
ture reform proposals, the influence is likely to be strongest for the proposals
submitted by state-controlled listed firms, as the state has stronger incentives to
get the reform done quickly for these firms (e.g., state-controlled firms serve as
an example to other listed companies). In addition, it is easier for the govern-
ment to coordinate an agreement for state-controlled listed firms, since it can
16It is easier for the government to exert influence on a small group of funds than on a large group
of funds.
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exert influence on both the mutual fund voting and the compensation proposals of
the nontradable shareholders. We therefore expect mutual funds to have a more
significant negative impact on the compensation ratio in state-controlled firms.
Our third hypothesis is
H3. Other things being equal, the negative relation between the fund ownership
and the compensation ratio strengthens with the increase of state ownership.
IV. Sample and Variables
A. Sample Selection
Our sample initially comprises all 1,302 listed companies that have finalized
their compensation plans as of the end of January 2007. However, we only focus
on firms that have offered shares as the sole consideration to compensate trad-
able A-shareholders to ensure the comparability of compensation across firms
and avoid the potential confounding effects that arise from the conversion and ag-
gregation of different forms of compensation (e.g., warrants, cash). As a result,
we exclude 248 firms from the sample. In addition, we exclude 6 financial firms.
The above criteria yield a sample of 1,048 firms.
B. Variables
Data on the split share structure reform are from the Wind Financial Infor-
mation System, which was commissioned by the CSRC to compile a database for
regulatory use. Accounting and stock price information, as well as mutual fund
and other institutional ownership, are also from Wind. Other ownership informa-
tion and board structure is obtained from the China Stock Market and Account-
ing Research (CSMAR) database. The Appendix provides brief descriptions and
summary statistics of the key variables, which we discuss next.
The final compensation ratio (i.e., the one that is eventually agreed between
the 2 sets of shareholders) is the dependent variable in our analysis. We define
the variable as the number of shares offered by nontradable shareholders to the
tradable shareholders for every 10 tradable shares they own.17 As can be seen from
the Appendix, the average number of shares received by the tradable shareholders
is 3.052 for every 10 shares they already own. The standard deviation is 0.738,
suggesting some variations in the compensation ratio across firms. The minimum
compensation ratio is 0.5, and the maximum is 7 shares. We also compute an
industry-adjusted compensation ratio, which is the compensation ratio for a firm
minus the 2-digit industry mean compensation ratio.18
17The details on the calculation of the compensation ratio and the source of the “bonus” shares
given to the tradable shareholders can be found in Appendix 1 in the early version of this paper (Firth
et al. (2008)).
18In calculating the 2-digit industry mean compensation ratio, we use the firms that finalized the
compensation ratio earlier in the same year and same industry to account for any time-related learning
or mimicking effect in setting the compensation ratio. A more detailed industry breakdown results in
a very small number of firms in some industry categories.
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The key independent variables of interest are state ownership and fund own-
ership, which we define as the number of a firm’s nontradable shares owned by
state-controlled entities and tradable shares owned by mutual funds, divided by
the total number of shares outstanding before the reform, respectively.19,20 We
measure state ownership at the prior year end before the reform and fund owner-
ship at the end of the last quarter before the reform.21 As can be seen from the
Appendix, state ownership on average accounts for 32% of total shares outstand-
ing. Mutual funds are the largest institutional investors in tradable shares. The
average aggregate fund holding is 5.4% of the total shares in issue (i.e., tradable
plus nontradable shares). This is about 76% of all the institutional tradable share-
holdings (i.e., total tradable shareholdings by all institutions is 7.1%) and 14% of
the total tradable shares.
We also control for the percentage of the nontradable shares in our mod-
els. The greater the percentage of nontradable shares, the greater the supply of
tradable shares will be after conversion, and this will lead to downward pressure
on the stock price; therefore, the existing tradable shareholders need more
compensation.
We use the net assets-to-price ratio (i.e., the book-to-price ratio) as a proxy
for the potential gain realized by the nontradable shareholders after the reform.
The rationale is that prior to the reform, nontradable shares can be transferred
through private negotiations at a price that is based on the net assets per share of
the firm. After the reform and after the end of the lockup period(s), the shares can
be sold at market price rather than at the net asset value. Thus, the nontradable
shareholders gain more from the reform if the net assets-to-price ratio is low.
This reasoning suggests a negative relation between compensation and the net
assets-to-price ratio. However, the ratio is also a proxy for the valuation of a firm.
A low net assets-to-price ratio (i.e., a high price-to-book ratio) implies the market
is positive about the prospects of the company. If so, the firm may be able to pay
a lower compensation as the ratio implies the firm is well managed. Therefore,
the relation between the net assets-to-price ratio and the compensation ratio is
an empirical issue. The mean of the ratio is 0.512, suggesting that on average the
price of a tradable A-share is about twice the price of the nontradable share (based
on net asset value).
We include several other firm-level controls. We measure firm size by the
natural logarithm of book value of total assets. Capital reserve ratio, the ratio of
capital reserves to total assets, is a control for the firm’s capacity to offer com-
pensation shares. The prevailing practice is that a firm first makes an issue of new
19We also compute the state ownership as the number of a firm’s nontradable shares owned by
state-controlled entities divided by the total number of nontradable shares (as opposed to all shares).
The results from using this specification do not change the conclusions of the paper, and so we do not
report them separately.
20We also investigate the ownership of the nontradable shares by determining the identity of the
controlling (or major) shareholder—a state entity or a private person/entity. If it is a state entity, then
we code state 1 and 0 otherwise (i.e., where a private person/entity is the controlling shareholder).
The results from using this alternative specification are broadly consistent with those reported in this
paper, and so we do not tabulate them.
21Compared with fund ownership and other institutional ownership, state ownership typically does
not fluctuate from quarter to quarter, and only annual information is available.
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shares using its capital reserve and then the nontradable shareholders give up their
entitled shares. Higher capital reserves facilitate the payment of higher compen-
sation. Leverage is a dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s debt ratio is
higher than the sample mean, and 0 otherwise. A continuous leverage measure is
not used due to its high correlation with the capital reserve ratio.
We include both market-based (market-adjusted stock return) and accounting-
based (return on assets (ROA)) performance variables to control for the effect
of performance. ROA is the past 4-year average of the net profit-to-total-assets
ratio before the reform. Market-adjusted stock return is the annualized market-
adjusted stock return over the 12 months before the reform. Both measures are
winsorized at the 1% and 99% percentile to eliminate extreme values. Firm risk is
another factor that may affect the compensation ratio. In addition to leverage, we
also control for a firm’s stock market risk, measured as the natural logarithm of
annualized stock price volatility (standard deviation of the weekly stock return)
over the 12-month period preceding the reform.
We also include several corporate governance variables to capture the effect
of governance quality on the compensation ratio; that is, board size (measured
by the number of directors), board independence (measured by the percentage
of independent directors on the board), and managerial ownership. As discussed
earlier, management shares are tradable, although there are lockup periods during
which they cannot be traded.
The aforementioned governance variables focus on the internal governance
schemes. We also include two external governance variables. The first one is a
dummy variable, which equals 1 if the firm’s financial statements are audited by
one of the Big 4 international auditing firms or their joint ventures with local CPA
firms, and 0 otherwise. The second variable relates to the regulatory disciplinary
actions, which equals 1 if the firm has been subject to a regulatory enforcement
action, and 0 otherwise. As can be seen from the Appendix, about 15.5% of the
firms have been sanctioned by the CSRC.
In Table 2 we show a four-way analysis of the mean duration of the reform
(measured as the number of days from the start to the completion of the reform).
When state ownership is high (above the median) and mutual fund ownership
is also high (above the median), the average duration is just 57 days. In con-
trast, when state ownership is low and mutual fund ownership is also low, the
mean time for negotiations is 77 days (i.e., it takes 35% longer to complete the
negotiations). The difference is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). It should
be noted that this comparison may overestimate the time taken for state-controlled
firms to complete the reform. This is because state-controlled firms need to obtain
the approval of the compensation plan from the state-owned assets administration
authorities and make public such approval before the voting, whereas private firms
are not subject to this requirement. The results also show that for firms with sim-
ilar state ownership, higher mutual fund ownership is associated with shorter du-
ration, and for firms with similar mutual fund ownership, higher state ownership
is associated with shorter duration of the reform. The results are quite explicit:
High state ownership and high mutual fund ownership are associated with faster
resolutions of the compensation terms. The results in Table 2 are consistent with
our predictions, which are based on the motivations of government bureaucrats
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TABLE 2
A Comparison of the Duration of the Reform
Table 2 compares the duration of the reform between ﬁrms with above- and below-sample median state ownership and
between ﬁrms with above- and below-sample median mutual fund ownership. Duration of the reform is deﬁned as the
number of days from the start to the completion of the reform. ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively.
Mutual Fund Ownership ≤ Mutual Fund Ownership >
State Ownership Sample Median Sample Median t-Value [p-value]
State Ownership< 77.0 days 65.1 days Row test:
Sample Median 11.88* [0.017]
State Ownership> 64.8 days 57.2 days Row test:
Sample Median 7.656* [0.031]
Diagonal test: Column test: Column test: Diagonal test:
0.26 [0.481] 12.15* [0.016] 7.92* [0.026] 19.8** [0.000]
(who administer the state’s nontradable shareholdings) and the investment deci-
sion committees of mutual funds (who vote the mutual funds’ tradable shares).
V. Empirical Results
A. Baseline Results
To isolate the impact of ownership influences on the compensation ratio, we
regress the compensation ratio on state and fund ownership, while controlling
for other relevant factors. We present the empirical results in Table 3. We start
with the results in Columns (1)–(4), which use the raw compensation ratio as the
dependent variable. In Column (1) we run a parsimonious model with state and
fund ownership and control for variables on firm risk, performance, and financial
conditions. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported.
The most striking result is that the level of state ownership is significantly
and positively related to the level of the compensation ratio, which is consis-
tent with our Hypothesis (H1) that the government bureaucrats who administer
the state’s shareholdings have strong incentives to complete the reform quickly
and without controversy. In addition, these bureaucrats are less concerned about
diluting control, as it is not their personal investment. Instead, the bureaucrats
are more interested in getting the reform completed efficiently to gain credit
and enhance their political careers. Mutual fund ownership is found to be neg-
atively associated with the compensation ratio, implying that mutual funds do not
fight hard for better compensation terms because of the political pressure exerted
on them.
Among the control variables, the coefficient on Other Institutional Tradable
Ownership is negative and statistically significant at the 1% level. The evidence
suggests that pressure-sensitive institutional shareholders (e.g., insurance compa-
nies, securities companies, and investment trust companies—the Other Institu-
tional Tradable Ownership in our case) may want to protect existing or potential
business relationships with firms and are less willing to challenge management
decisions (see Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Cornett, Marcus, Saunders, and
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TABLE 3
Regression Results of Compensation Ratios on State and Fund Ownership
Table 3 reports the regression results of the raw compensation (COMP) and industry-mean-adjusted compensation (Adj.
COMP) ratios on state and fund ownership and control variables. Robust p-values are reported in brackets. ** and * denote
signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively (two-tailed). The coefﬁcients of the constant are omitted.
Adj. Adj. Adj. Adj.
COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP COMP
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
State ownership 0.480 0.498 0.591 0.603 0.392 0.405 0.495 0.498
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]**
Fund ownership –0.863 –0.862 –0.391 –0.398 –0.656 –0.672 –0.221 –0.261
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.170] [0.167] [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.414] [0.343]
Fund ownership× –1.802 –1.749 –1.665 –1.552
state ownership [0.004]** [0.006]** [0.006]** [0.011]*
Other institutional –1.126 –1.171 –1.145 –1.191 –1.249 –1.306 –1.267 –1.324
tradable ownership [0.009]** [0.007]** [0.008]** [0.007]** [0.005]** [0.004]** [0.005]** [0.004]**
Nontradable shares 2.699 2.690 2.678 2.674 2.541 2.536 2.523 2.522
ratio [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.000]**
Net assets-to-price 0.178 0.177 0.169 0.170 0.137 0.131 0.129 0.124
ratio [0.056] [0.060] [0.068] [0.071] [0.105] [0.123] [0.127] [0.143]
Firm size 0.050 0.037 0.053 0.040 0.046 0.036 0.049 0.038
[0.073] [0.200] [0.056] [0.165] [0.095] [0.214] [0.075] [0.181]
Capital reserve 0.162 0.156 0.156 0.150 0.105 0.103 0.100 0.098
[0.009]** [0.011]* [0.010]** [0.013]* [0.045]* [0.043]* [0.052] [0.053]
Leverage dummy –0.027 –0.024 –0.026 –0.022 –0.040 –0.037 –0.038 –0.035
[0.540] [0.593] [0.559] [0.618] [0.359] [0.394] [0.373] [0.412]
Return on assets –1.592 –1.588 –1.591 –1.578 –1.654 –1.679 –1.653 –1.671
[0.003]** [0.004]** [0.003]** [0.004]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]** [0.001]**
Market-adjusted 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
stock return [0.055] [0.091] [0.055] [0.091] [0.112] [0.166] [0.113] [0.166]
Stock volatility 0.144 0.135 0.145 0.139 0.054 0.041 0.056 0.045
[0.128] [0.179] [0.122] [0.163] [0.548] [0.669] [0.534] [0.636]
Managerial 6.803 6.195 7.918 7.378
ownership [0.852] [0.867] [0.849] [0.860]
Board independence 0.655 0.636 0.340 0.323
[0.156] [0.165] [0.462] [0.481]
Board size 0.015 0.014 0.016 0.015
[0.130] [0.141] [0.096] [0.103]
Big 4 auditor 0.018 0.012 0.029 0.024
[0.773] [0.847] [0.645] [0.707]
Law violation –0.042 –0.037 –0.053 –0.049
dummy [0.527] [0.569] [0.420] [0.452]
Year and industry dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1,042 1,031 1,042 1,031 1,042 1,031 1,042 1,031
Adj. R2 0.309 0.313 0.313 0.316 0.233 0.238 0.236 0.241
Tehranian (2007), and Mehran and Stulz (2007) for evidence from the U.S. on in-
stitutional investors protecting their business interests). These conflicts of interest
may lead institutional shareholders to accept lower compensation in order to curry
favor with the firm’s management team. In addition, other institutional investors
that are owned by the state may also be under pressure from the CSRC to agree
to the compensation terms.
As expected, compensation is higher in firms that have a greater proportion
of nontradable shares. In such firms, the greater supply of tradable shares after the
reform may exert a higher downward pressure on stock price and so higher com-
pensation is required. The coefficient on Capital Reserve is positive and highly
significant, suggesting that higher capital reserves facilitate the payment of higher
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compensation. As for the performance variables, the coefficient on Return on As-
sets is negative and significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, firms with good his-
torical performance pay lower compensation than do firms with poor historical
performance. The other performance measure, Market-Adjusted Stock Return, is
found to have a positive but insignificant impact on compensation ratio at the 5%
level or better. No other control variables are found to have a significant impact
on the compensation ratio. In Column (2), we add governance control variables
into the regression, and they are found to have little effect on the compensation
ratio. Managerial Ownership has a positive coefficient, but it is not statistically
significant. Managers own tradable shares, and so they benefit from higher com-
pensation. However, they have limited influence on the compensation ratio, as
they are not directly involved in the negotiations. This helps explain the positive
but insignificant coefficient.
In Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 we include a multiplicative interaction
term between fund ownership and state ownership to test for the possibility that
the effect of fund ownership on the compensation ratio is conditioned on the level
of state ownership. The results show that the coefficients on the interaction term
are negative and significant at the 0.01 level. Therefore, the negative effect of
fund ownership on the compensation ratio is strengthened with the increase of
state ownership. In other words, the positive link between state ownership and the
compensation ratio is substantially weakened by mutual fund ownership, other
things being equal. Also, note that in firms without any state ownership, the co-
efficients on fund ownership are negative but insignificant. These results provide
support for our hypothesis that political pressure on mutual funds is likely to be
higher in firms with a substantial level of state ownership than in firms controlled
by private owners. In fact, the “helping hand” effects of mutual funds are directed
mainly toward state-controlled firms, and the effects toward private firms are not
statistically significant. The marginal effect of state ownership on the compensa-
tion ratio is (0.603 – 1.749 × Fund Ownership) (based on the results in Column
(4)). Thus, firms with state ownership pay lower compensation if there is a high
level of mutual fund ownership of the tradable shares. Here, the major nontrad-
able shareholders believe that mutual funds will be acquiescent in accepting the
terms offered (due to pressure from the CSRC), and they take advantage of this
by proposing lower compensation. However, when mutual fund ownership is ab-
sent or very low, the nontradable shareholders need to negotiate with individual
shareholders, and these investors are more politically pressure-resistant and less
compliant than mutual funds. Our evidence illustrates quite clearly that, in the
particular circumstance of the share structure reform, the state influences both
parties of the compensation negotiation process. On the one hand, the state allows
firms with state ownership to offer higher compensation to ensure the smooth-
ness of the reform negotiations. On the other hand, the state also exerts influence
(via the CSRC) on mutual fund shareholders, the largest group of tradable share-
holders (and maybe other institutional shareholders as well), to ensure that they
“cooperate” with the government’s desire for a noncontentious proposal, and this,
in effect, reduces the compensation ratio offered by state-owned firms. Our re-
sults also show that the mutual funds do not act in the best interests of their unit
holders. Instead, they appear to be agents of the state, carrying out the wishes
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of the CSRC. In private firms, the Fund Ownership coefficients are negative, al-
though not significant, and so even here, mutual funds do not bargain for better
compensation.
In Columns (5)–(8) of Table 3 we use the industry-mean-adjusted com-
pensation ratio as the dependent variable. The industry-adjusted ratio provides
a more explicit control for the possible industry patterns in offering compen-
sation. Clearly, the results in Columns (5)–(8) are qualitatively similar to those
of Columns (1)–(4), respectively, and so we do not comment on them any
further.
B. Results from the Market Event Analysis
In order to gain more insights into the reform, we conduct a market event
analysis and explore the market reaction to the announcement of the final compen-
sation ratio. We obtain prices that appropriately adjust for capitalization changes
and distributions in calculating stock and index returns from Wind. We then use
the single-factor market model to estimate beta and normal returns. The market in-
dex is the Shanghai Composite Index for companies listed on the Shanghai Stock
Exchange and the Shenzhen Composite Index for companies listed on the Shen-
zhen Stock Exchange. These market indexes include all the common stocks listed
on the respective stock exchanges, and they are commonly used in event studies
in China. The market model has been used extensively in China (see Chen, Firth,
Gao, and Rui (2005)). We use Day 0 to denote the announcement day and Day 1 to
denote the first trading day following the announcement of the compensation plan
(note that the proposed compensation needs to be voted on at the shareholders’
meeting later). The results reported in Table 4 are based on an estimation window
of [–4, –63].22 The mean 2-day cumulative abnormal return (CAR) following the
announcement of the final compensation ratio is 3.6% (Panel B, Window [1, 2]),
indicating that stock prices typically experience a significant rise following the
announcement. This implies that the final terms of the compensation are better
than expected and/or there is a palpable relief that the firm can now move forward
and management can concentrate on improving operating performance.23
The abnormal return on Day 1 is regressed on state ownership and mutual
fund ownership, while controlling for the compensation ratio and other factors.
To investigate whether the market reaction varies between firms with and with-
out fund ownership, we include an interaction term between a dummy mutual
fund ownership variable (one for firms with fund ownership) and the compensa-
tion ratio (COMP × DFUND). The results, presented in Table 5, show: i) there
is no statistically significant relation between state and fund ownership per se
on the abnormal return on Day 1, while there is a positive and significant rela-
tion between the announced compensation ratio and abnormal return; and ii) the
22We also use several alternative estimation windows, but they yield similar results to those reported
in Table 4.
23We note that the positive and significant stock return is also consistent with an alternative argu-
ment that successfully negotiated compensation ratios will imply a higher liquidity and a lower cost in
the trading of the firm’s stocks, which may help lower a firm’s cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson
(2000)). We thank Stephen Brown (the editor) for pointing this out.
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TABLE 4
Market Reaction to the Announcement of Final Compensation Ratio
Table 4 presents the results of an event study on the market reaction to the announcement of the ﬁnal compensation
ratio. Prices that appropriately adjust for capitalization changes and distributions are used in calculating stock and index
returns. A single-factor market model is used to estimate beta and normal returns. The chosen market index is the Shanghai
Composite Index for companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and the Shenzhen Composite Index for companies
listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. Thesemarket indexes include all the common stocks listed on the respective stock
exchange, and they are commonly used in event studies in China. We use Day 0 to denote the announcement day and
Day 1 to denote the ﬁrst trading day following the announcement of the compensation plan. Abnormal return = actual stock
return – stock return predicted by the single-factor market model based on the estimation period of [–4, –63]. t-values are
reported in brackets. ** denotes signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
Panel A. Abnormal Return (AR)
Day –3 –2 –1 1 2 3
Mean AR 0.004 0.005 0.007 0.026 0.010 0.008
[5.155]** [6.232]** [8.891]** [13.755]** [7.766]** [7.245]**
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
Days [–1, 1] [–1, 2] [1, 2]
Mean CAR 0.033 0.043 0.036
[16.338]** [15.657]** [13.584]**
coefficient on the interaction term is negative and statistically significant in the
pooled analysis (Column (1)). This indicates that the presence of fund ownership
weakens the positive link between announced compensation ratio and abnormal
return. Thus, the abnormal stock return for firms with fund ownership is signif-
icantly lower than that for firms without fund ownership. Individual investors in
tradable A-shares seem to be disappointed at the role of mutual funds in the re-
form bargaining process. A further analysis (reported in Column (2) “State Own-
ership ≤ Median” and Column (3) “State Ownership > Median”) indicates that
the lower market return experienced by firms that have mutual funds as investors
is much more pronounced in firms with higher-than-sample-median state owner-
ship than in other firms. These results provide additional support for our argument
that mutual funds are reluctant to fight for better compensation, and this especially
applies in firms with a high level of state ownership.
In Columns (4)–(6) of Table 5 we add the interaction term between the
dummy variable of other institutional tradable ownership (DOTHER) and the
compensation ratio to the regression model. The coefficients on the interaction
term COMP × DFUND are still negative and significant in the pooled sample
and in the sample of firms with higher-than-sample-median state ownership. The
coefficients on COMP × DOTHER are always negative but only significant in
firms with higher-than-sample-median state ownership. This suggests that indi-
vidual investors are also disappointed at the role of pressure-sensitive institutional
investors other than mutual funds in the reform negotiation process of firms with
higher-than-sample-median state ownership.
C. Why Do Individual Investors Feel Disappointed?
We next explore why individual investors feel ex post disappointed with the
voting actions of the mutual funds. It is plausible that for firms with mutual fund
ownership, individual investors will choose to free ride and rely on the mutual
funds in the bargaining process. This is because they may believe mutual funds
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TABLE 5
Regression Results of Abnormal Returns on Day 1 on Fund Ownership
Table 5 presents the regression results of abnormal returns on Day 1 on fund ownership, controlling for compensation ratio
(COMP) and other variables. Day 0 is the announcement day, and Day 1 is the ﬁrst trading day following the announcement.
DFUND= 1 if a ﬁrm has fund ownership and 0 otherwise. DOTHER = 1 if a ﬁrm has other institutional tradable ownership and
0 otherwise. Abnormal return = actual stock return – stock return predicted by the market model based on the estimation
period of [–4, –63]. Robust p-values are reported in brackets. ** and * denote signiﬁcance at the 1% and 5% levels,
respectively.
State State State State
Ownership≤ Ownership> Ownership≤ Ownership>
Pooled Median Median Pooled Median Median
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
State ownership –0.003 0.014 –0.007 –0.003 0.015 –0.009
[0.738] [0.676] [0.796] [0.780] [0.655] [0.733]
Fund ownership 0.008 0.014 –0.015 0.012 0.016 –0.009
[0.694] [0.627] [0.581] [0.557] [0.608] [0.735]
COMP× DFUND –0.004 –0.003 –0.005 –0.003 –0.003 –0.004
[0.003]** [0.103] [0.009]** [0.008]** [0.107] [0.034]*
Other institutional tradable 0.028 0.130 –0.075 0.077 0.141 0.010
ownership [0.582] [0.113] [0.354] [0.174] [0.126] [0.911]
COMP× DOTHER –0.003 –0.001 –0.004
[0.097] [0.781] [0.046]*
Firm size 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.002
[0.956] [0.932] [0.725] [0.748] [0.904] [0.451]
Tradable shares ratio 0.005 0.001 –0.001 0.004 0.001 –0.007
[0.810] [0.977] [0.970] [0.850] [0.983] [0.858]
Compensation ratio 0.013 0.016 0.004 0.014 0.016 0.005
[0.000]** [0.000]** [0.384] [0.000]** [0.000]** [0.360]
Leverage 0.000 –0.004 0.000 0.000 –0.004 0.000
[0.437] [0.344] [0.634] [0.436] [0.346] [0.547]
Intercept –0.019 –0.033 0.010 –0.025 –0.034 0.001
[0.492] [0.432] [0.817] [0.361] [0.416] [0.987]
Year and industry dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
N 1,042 527 515 1,042 527 515
Adj. R2 0.037 0.053 0.049 0.040 0.053 0.056
will fight for better compensation terms and/or they think that their diffuse owner-
ships cannot exert a significant influence on the bargaining process when a large
block of fund ownership is present. In contrast, in firms without mutual fund
ownership, individual investors are more likely to actively engage in the voting
process and fight for themselves. To test this, we collect data on the proportion
of individual tradable A-shares that participate in the voting and test the differ-
ence between firms with and without mutual fund ownership. Table 6 presents the
results.
TABLE 6
Voting Rates by Individual Investors: Firms with versus without Fund Ownership
Table 6 compares the voting rates by individual tradable-share investors between ﬁrms with and without fund ownership.
Voting rate is the proportion of tradable shares owned by individual investors that participated in the vote. ** denotes
signiﬁcance at the 1% level.
With Fund Without Fund
Wilcoxon
Predicted Sign Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-Stat. Test z-Stat.
With fund ownership > 0.06 0.015 0.251 0.007 [9.214]** [8.996]**
Without fund ownership
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We find that the mean voting rate of individual investors in firms without fund
ownership is 25.1% of the total number of tradable shares owned by individuals,
which is over 4 times the voting rate of individual shareholders (6%) in firms with
mutual fund ownership. The difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The individual investors vote less frequently if the listed firm has a mutual fund
as an investor. Thus, the individual investors appear to rely on mutual funds to
force through a good deal on compensation. However, based on the stock return
analyses, investors seem disappointed with the outcomes.
VI. Conclusion
In the past 20 years, there has been a significant increase in corporate pri-
vatization and restructuring in transitional economies, and this has received sig-
nificant research attention in the literature. At the same time, the institutional
ownership of common stocks has increased dramatically worldwide over the same
period. In developed markets, institutional investors, such as mutual funds, are
generally believed to monitor management and to fight hard to maximize stock
returns, and their actions benefit the small individual investors. However, our un-
derstanding of the role that institutional shareholders (e.g., mutual funds) play in
corporate governance and investor protection in emerging markets is quite lim-
ited. In this paper, we add to the two strands of literature by exploring the role of
government shareholders and mutual funds in the bargaining process of the split
share structure reform in China. This represents an ideal setting to examine gover-
nance issues because it is unlikely to suffer from the problems (e.g., endogeneity)
that normally plague these types of studies.
In 2005–2006, the Chinese government launched a full-scale reform of listed
firms to make nonpublicly tradable shares publicly tradable. To obtain the flota-
tion rights of their shares, nontradable shareholders need to negotiate a compensa-
tion plan with the tradable shareholders and eventually obtain their approval. The
state plays a unique role in the reform through its ability to influence the parties
to the negotiation (particularly in state-owned firms). The mutual fund sharehold-
ers also play a crucial role in this negotiation process. We analyze the incentive
structure of both the government and the mutual funds as shareholders in listed
firms.
Firms whose nontradable shares are primarily owned by the state offer higher
compensation than firms whose nontradable shares are primarily owned by pri-
vate investors. This finding is consistent with our arguments that the state is very
concerned with a speedy and noncontroversial resolution of the reform and that
the state bureaucrats are not as concerned with dilution of control as are private
investors. Our empirical tests also indicate that mutual fund ownership has a neg-
ative and statistically significant effect on the final compensation ratio. More im-
portantly, we find that mutual fund ownership weakens the positive link between
state ownership and compensation, suggesting that mutual funds help state-owned
firms get the reform done more quickly and at a relatively lower cost. In fact, af-
ter controlling for the interaction term between state ownership and mutual fund
ownership, the negative effects of mutual funds become insignificant, suggesting
that the helping hand from mutual funds is geared mainly toward the state-owned
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listed companies. This result is in stark contrast to the argument that mutual funds
will strive for better returns for their unit holders (and, by extension, the individual
shareholders) by seeking higher compensation.
Overall, these findings shed some light on the political influence of the state
and the compromised role of mutual funds in the split share structure reform in
China. Although the Chinese government is gradually relinquishing its control
over economic matters, our results clearly indicate that the state still intercedes to
apply strong political pressure when there are specific policy initiatives it wants
to enforce. A major implication of our findings is that mutual funds are not a
crutch that the individual shareholders can rely on, as the “free ride” for individual
shareholders results in lower compensation than would otherwise be the case.
An event study that examines the market reaction to the announcement of the final
compensation ratio suggests that individual investors are disappointed at the role
of mutual funds in the reform bargaining process in the state-controlled firms.
Our study represents an important extension to the literature on the role of mutual
funds by focusing on the incentives and pressures they face in the world’s fastest-
growing economy.
APPENDIX
Variable Definitions
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Median Std. Dev. N
Compensation ratio Number of shares given by nontradable
shareholders to tradable shareholders
for every 10 tradable shares already
owned.
3.052 3.100 0.738 1,048
Industry-adjusted
compensation ratio
Industry-mean-adjusted compensation ratio
based on the CSRC 2001 two-digit in-
dustry code.
0.000 0.038 0.690 1,048
State ownership Number of shares held by the government
and state-owned enterprises ÷ total
number of shares in issue of the ﬁrm
measured at the prior year end before
the reform.
0.320 0.000 0.467 1,048
Fund ownership Number of shares in a ﬁrm held by mutual
funds ÷ total number of shares in issue
of the ﬁrm measured at the end of the
quarter before the reform.
0.054 0.001 0.110 1,048
Other institutional tradable
ownership
Number of tradable shares held by other in-
stitutional investors ÷ total number of
shares in issue measured at the end of
the quarter before the reform.
0.017 0.000 0.036 1,048
Nontradable shares Number of nontradable shares ÷ the total
number of shares in issue measured at
the prior year end before the reform.
0.610 0.625 0.109 1,048
Net assets-to-price ratio Net assets per share to tradable A-share
price ratio. Price is the 3-month average
price before the reform.
0.512 0.484 0.349 1,045
Firm size Company size deﬁned as the natural log of
book value of total assets.
11.981 11.922 0.969 1,048
Capital reserve ratio Capital reserves ÷ total assets. 0.219 0.188 0.320 1,048
Leverage dummy Equals 1 if a ﬁrm’s total debt ratio≥ the mean
of the sample’s total debt ratio, and 0
otherwise.
0.252 0.258 0.219 1,052
Return on assets Four-year average of the net proﬁt-to-total-
assets ratio before the reform.
0.025 0.029 0.062 1,053
(continued on next page)
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APPENDIX (continued)
Variable Definitions
Variable Deﬁnition Mean Median Std. Dev. N
Market-adjusted
stock return
Annualized abnormal stock return over the 12
months before the reform (actual stock
return – the expected return from the
market model).
1.685 –1.828 32.619 1,048
Stock volatility Log of annualized standard deviation of
weekly stock return over the 12-month
period before the reform.
3.619 3.618 0.271 1,048
Managerial ownership Number of shares owned by a ﬁrm’s directors
and managers÷ total number of shares
in issue, measured at the prior year end
before the reform.
0.000 0.000 0.000 1,037
Board independence Number of independent directors on the
board÷ board size.
0.345 0.333 0.045 1,048
Board size Number of directors on the board. 9.674 9.000 2.078 1,048
Big 4 auditor dummy Equals 1 if the ﬁrm’s ﬁnancial statements are
audited by one of the Big 4 accounting
ﬁrms or their joint ventures in the year be-
fore the reform.
0.135 0.000 0.341 1,048
Law violation dummy Equals 1 if the ﬁrm (or its directors and man-
agers) received CSRC disciplinary ac-
tions before the reform, and 0 otherwise.
0.155 0.000 0.362 1,048
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